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ABSTRACT 
Margot E. Howard: Are Firms Stockpiling Foreign Earnings? 
(Under the direction of Douglas A. Shackelford) 
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (the Act) created a temporary opportunity for 
U.S. firms to repatriate certain foreign earnings, determined in part by a firm’s permanently 
reinvested earnings (PRE), at a significantly reduced tax rate.  Firm balances of PRE have soared 
over recent years and some have speculated that it is partially attributable to the Act.  My results 
reveal that firms experienced a spike in changes to PRE after the Act only in 2006, rather than an 
ongoing trend of increased changes to PRE throughout the post-Act period.  I also examine 
whether the Act changed investor expectations related to repatriation tax liabilities and my 
results indicate that while there was no permanent shift in valuation, investors responded to the 
possibility of another tax holiday.  Overall, my results provide insight into the firm and market 
effects of tax legislation and shed light on the “stockpiling” of PRE as discussed by the media, 
legislators, and the related literature amid concerns that the Act has led firms to hoard 
disproportionately large amounts of foreign profits overseas in anticipation of another tax 
holiday. 
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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
  
This paper investigates the reported surge in permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) that 
has occurred since the repatriation tax holiday under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
(the Act).
1
  While it is generally reported that firms increased their PRE in the period following 
the Act and some assert that firms have “stockpiled” PRE in anticipation of another tax holiday, 
there is, to my knowledge, little research that provides empirical evidence of this claim or 
investigates the details of this increase in PRE related to the Act.
2,3
   
I hypothesize that the increase in reported PRE was disproportionately from firms that 
repatriated under the favorable terms of the Act and/or firms that repatriated the maximum 
eligible amount under the Act.  Contrary to my hypotheses I find no evidence of an ongoing 
trend of increased changes to PRE or a concentration of increased changes to PRE within any 
one group during the post-Act period.  Rather, it appears that all firms increased their changes to 
PRE only in 2006, immediately after the repatriation period under the Act ended.  Further 
investigation also indicates that firms that repatriated the maximum amount under the Act had 
relatively smaller changes to PRE during the recent financial crisis.  My results also indicate that 
                                                     
1
The tax holiday under the Act provided an 85 percent dividends received deduction to U.S. firms that repatriated 
earnings (had their foreign subsidiaries pay dividends to the U.S. parent) back to the United States.  The Act is 
discussed in greater detail in Section 2.   
 
2
United States Senate (2011), Fleischer (2012), and New York Times Editorial Board (2014) are just a few examples 
of the many claims that the Act led to firms hoarding cash abroad.   
 
3
Ayers et al. (2014) examine mandatory disclosure and find an increased likelihood that a firm will start to report 
PRE after the Act.  This study differs in that it examines how reporting behavior changed after the Act for firms that 
were already reporting PRE before the Act and investigates how that behavior change varies across different groups 
of firms.     
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firms that repatriated under the Act increased their changes to PRE in 2003, in advance of the 
Act.        
I also investigate whether the Act changed investors’ valuation of the disclosed tax 
liability associated with PRE.  Numerous studies have investigated the market valuation of PRE 
and/or the disclosed or estimated deferred tax liability related to PRE (Collins et al., 2001; Oler 
et al. 2007; Bryant-Kutcher et al., 2008; among others) before or around the time of the Act.  
However, no study, to my knowledge, has thoroughly investigated whether the Act led to a shift 
in investor expectations about future repatriation tax rates, as exhibited through investors’ 
valuation of the repatriation tax liability, in the post-Act period.  I hypothesize that investors’ 
valuation of the tax liability associated with PRE will become less negative in the post-Act 
period, reflecting the expectation of another tax holiday.  My results suggest that the Act did not 
lead to a permanent shift in investors’ valuation of the repatriation tax liability.  Rather it appears 
that investors only alter their valuation as legislation is proposed for a tax holiday, similar to 
investor reaction in the time preceding the Act.      
The recent growth in PRE has attracted attention from many quarters, including 
Congressional testimony from Jack T. Ciesielski, an accounting and investment expert:  
In 2006, the year after firms were allowed to repatriate earnings at a reduced tax 
rate, the total balance was only $618.5 billion. In the space of five years, the 
balance of indefinitely reinvested earnings more than doubled, growing at an 
average rate of 20% per year. Firms had depleted their balances somewhat in 
2005, when they were permitted to repatriate earnings at a 5.25% tax rate. Still, 
firms have added indefinitely reinvested earnings at a remarkable rate in just the 
last several years: over $450 billion in just 2011 and 2010.
4
 
 
A 2011 Senate Majority Staff Report attributed this rise in PRE to the Act itself: 
Even more disturbing is that the 2004 repatriation rewarded corporations that kept 
substantial funds offshore, and has created a new incentive for U.S. corporations 
to keep shipping jobs and diverting domestic funds offshore…The long term 
                                                     
4
Ciesielski (2012). 
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consequence of that policy is the current corporate stockpiling of offshore funds 
in anticipation of another repatriation tax break allowing multinational 
corporations to use a 5.25% tax rate in place of the top 35% rate that applies to 
domestic corporations. (Emphasis added)
5
  
 
The Majority Staff report also identified the 15 firms with the highest repatriations under the Act.  
Figure 1 graphs the PRE of these 15 firms for 1999 through 2010.  The graph shows a steady 
climb in PRE through 2004, followed by a massive drop in 2005 as a result of repatriations under 
the Act.  However, PRE quickly rises again and surpasses pre-Act levels in just two years.  The 
media has also attributed this rise in PRE directly to the Act with statements such as “The tax 
holiday also raised expectations for future tax holidays, and companies have changed their 
behavior accordingly by hoarding cash offshore” (Fleischer 2012) and “Such a reprieve in 2005 
was disastrous, in part because it encouraged the hoarding of profits in tax-deferred foreign 
accounts in anticipation of future tax holidays” (New York Times Editorial Board 2014).  The 
academic community has also commented on this issue, although their remarks have typically 
been less inflammatory.  As Dartmouth College professor Leslie Robinson noted in her recent 
Congressional testimony, “[I]t is my conjecture that the recent build-up of undistributed earnings 
since the 2005 tax holiday is at least, in part, driven by the expectation of a potential future tax 
holiday.”   
Understanding firms’ reporting of PRE and how it has changed because of the Act is 
important not only so we can evaluate the claims made by legislators, academics, and the media, 
but also for the light it can shed on the potential impact of future tax policy.  The projected 
response to the repatriation tax holiday under the Act, $2.8 billion in tax revenue, was 
significantly underestimated, with firms repatriating $312 billion of qualified dividends, resulting 
in actual revenues of $18 billion, over six times the estimated amount.  Having a better 
                                                     
5
United States Senate (2011).   
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comprehension of PRE would help with estimating the response to another tax holiday similar to 
the Act, which has been suggested several times over the past few years.  During the 112th 
Congress (2011-2012) numerous bills were introduced that include proposals to reduce the 
effective tax rate on repatriations, either temporarily or permanently (Gravelle and Marples, 
2011).
6
  Last year there were also discussions in Congress of another repatriation tax holiday to, 
in part, help raise revenues for the dangerously low federal Highway Trust Fund.
7
  In Graham et 
al. (2010) 64.7 percent of responding tax executives indicated that they would take advantage of 
another future repatriation tax holiday, suggesting that the response to a future holiday could be 
significant and making an understanding of the impact of the previous tax holiday even more 
critical.  President Obama’s current budget proposal includes a 14 percent tax on existing PRE 
and a 19 percent tax on future foreign earnings, a clear change from the current deferral available 
for PRE under APB 23.
8
  Therefore, even absent another repatriation tax holiday it is important 
to understand how the Act has changed firm reporting of PRE and investor perceptions of PRE.   
In addition, tax executives’ survey responses indicate that the financial accounting implications 
are as important as the cash tax consequences in making decisions on repatriating or reinvesting 
foreign earnings (Graham et al., 2011).  Presumably, the financial accounting implications are so 
important at least in part because of how investors interpret and use that information when 
valuing the firm.  Therefore, it is important to know whether the Act has affected investors’ 
valuation of the PRE-related tax liability.  
Despite all the discussion about the increase in PRE since the Act and the importance of 
understanding how the Act affected PRE, there has been little investigation into the details and 
                                                     
6
For additional details see H.R. 937, H.R. 1036, H.R. 1834, H.R. 2862, S. 727, and S. 1671 from the 112
th
 Congress. 
 
7
Weisman (2014), New York Times Editorial Board (2014), and Stephenson and Temple-West (2014).  
  
8
Timiraos and McKinnon (2015).   
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causes of this increase.  My study contributes to the literature by providing evidence on a topic 
that is often assumed to be true – that firms have increased their changes to PRE in recent years.  
My results reveal that although firms have in fact increased their changes to PRE in the post-Act 
period it has not been an ongoing trend.  Rather there was a spike in changes to PRE only in 
2006.  My results also suggest that some firms have actually relatively decreased their changes to 
PRE in the post-Act period, even after controlling for general macroeconomic effects.  I also 
provide evidence that investors’ valuation of the tax liability associated with PRE did not 
permanently shift after the Act, but became less negative as investors anticipated another 
possible tax holiday.   
 This paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides background on the Act and a 
summary of the related literature.  Section 3 outlines the development of my hypotheses.  Section 
4 discusses my proposed research design and sample.  Section 5 presents my results.  Section 6 
concludes.     
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SECTION 2: BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE 
 
The earnings of a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. firm are generally subject to U.S. income 
tax upon distribution of those earnings back to the U.S. firm (repatriation tax).
9
  Firms receive a 
credit for foreign taxes paid on such earnings, reducing the amount of tax due upon repatriation.  
However, as shown in Figure 2, the U.S. corporate income tax rate has generally been higher 
than foreign corporate income tax rates in recent years, meaning that firms generally still owe 
U.S. taxes upon repatriation.  Although the cash taxes are not due until the firm actually brings 
the earnings back to the U.S., under financial accounting rules a deferred tax liability would 
typically need to be recognized along with the foreign earnings, accounting for the tax that will 
be paid when the foreign earnings are repatriated back to the U.S.  However, under APB Opinion 
No. 23 no repatriation tax liability has to be recognized if the firm provides sufficient evidence 
that the foreign subsidiary’s earnings will be invested indefinitely overseas or the earnings will 
be remitted as part of a tax-free liquidation.  Firms can therefore delay the recognition of the 
repatriation tax on their financial statements by declaring that earnings from foreign subsidiaries 
are permanently reinvested abroad.  Paragraph 44c of SFAS No. 109 states that firms must 
                                                     
9
The amount of repatriation tax due depends on several factors, including whether the foreign tax rate applied to 
foreign earnings is greater or less than the U.S. tax rate.  In addition, because of differences in book and tax 
amounts, the actual cash taxes that would be paid upon the repatriation of foreign earnings is not necessarily the 
same as the book tax liability calculated for the repatriation of those earnings.  Taking a simplified view of the 
calculation, the repatriation liability will be equal to pretax PRE (PRE grossed up by the applicable foreign tax rate) 
multiplied by the difference between the applicable U.S. income tax and foreign income tax rates.  In addition, this 
discussion does not take into account Subpart F rules, which are beyond the scope of this study.     
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disclose the amount of the unrecognized deferred tax liability related to PRE or state that the 
determination of that amount is not practicable.
10
   
The Act created a tax holiday for repatriated earnings.  Specifically, the Act provided a 
temporary 85 percent deduction for qualified dividends paid from a foreign subsidiary to its U.S. 
parent.  The Act was unique in the way that the cash tax consequences of this deduction were 
tied to a financial statement amount, permanently reinvested earnings (PRE).  Specifically, under 
Internal Revenue Code Section 965(b) qualified dividends were restricted to the greater of (1) 
$500 million, (2) the amount designated as PRE on the most recent audited financial statements 
filed on or before June 30, 2003, or (3) if only the tax liability related to PRE was disclosed, an 
amount equal to the tax liability divided by 35 percent. The dividends received deduction was 
further limited to extraordinary dividends, defined as repatriations made during the year that 
were in excess of the average repatriation during the previous five years (excluding the highest 
and lowest repatriation amounts during those years).
11
 
This paper is related to two streams of literature: studies related to PRE and related 
repatriation taxes and studies more specifically examining the consequences of the repatriation 
provisions of the Act, though there is undoubtedly some overlap between the two.  Within the 
PRE literature some studies focus on firm characteristics and actions.  Krull (2004) hypothesizes 
and finds that firms use PRE to manage earnings to meet analysts’ forecasts.  Foley et al. (2007) 
find that firms that would face higher repatriation taxes hold higher levels of cash abroad, 
presumably to avoid the tax costs of repatriation.  Graham et al. (2011) conduct a survey of 
almost 600 tax executives about factors they consider when deciding where to locate operations 
and whether to reinvest foreign earnings abroad.  The results suggest that in addition to cash tax 
                                                     
10
See Donohoe et al. (2012) for a more thorough discussion of PRE and APB Opinion No. 23.   
 
11
See Blouin and Krull (2009) for a more thorough discussion of the Act.   
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costs, financial accounting repatriation tax considerations are also an important factor in making 
decisions regarding repatriation and foreign reinvestment.  Blouin et al. (2012) find that 
reporting incentives discourage repatriation of foreign earnings back to the U.S.  Hanlon et al. 
(2014) investigate the relation between U.S. repatriation taxes and foreign investment and find a 
higher likelihood of foreign acquisitions for firms with cash that is “locked-out” because of 
repatriation taxes.   
Other studies within the PRE literature focus on the market interpretation of PRE.  
Investor valuation of PRE was first investigated by Collins et al. (2001).  Their results show that 
the market impounds the unrecognized but disclosed deferred tax liability related to PRE into 
firm value.  Their results also suggest that the market similarly values PRE for firms that report a 
zero deferred tax liability related to PRE, firms that state that it is not practicable to estimate a 
deferred tax liability related to PRE, and firms that provide no information on the tax liability 
related to PRE.   
Bryant-Kutcher et al. (2008) build on these results, incorporating findings from Foley et 
al. (2007) and DeWaegenaere and Sansing (2008).  The authors partition their sample on whether 
a firm holds high amounts of excess cash, assuming that these firms (compared to low excess 
cash firms) are more likely to hold PRE in financial assets rather than operating assets.  The 
authors hypothesize that PRE invested in financial assets is valued less than PRE invested in 
operating assets and find evidence that supports that conclusion.  They also find that PRE 
invested in financial assets is valued less in firms that report a positive deferred repatriation tax 
liability, compared to firms that report a zero repatriation tax liability or do not provide 
information on the repatriation tax liability.  
 
 
9 
 
Oler et al. (2007) study how investors’ valuation of the potential tax liability associated 
with the repatriation of PRE changed with the Act.  Their results suggest that although investors 
priced the estimated liability before the Act, that valuation of the liability became less negative 
during the Act period, reflecting the potential for repatriating earnings at a reduced tax rate under 
the Act.   
Several studies have specifically investigated repatriations under the Act.  Repatriating 
firms had lower investment opportunities and higher free cash flows compared to non-
repatriating firms (Blouin and Krull, 2009).  In regards to economic consequences of Act, there 
is evidence that the repatriations were not associated with an increase in domestic investment, 
employment, or R&D, part of the explicit purpose of the Act.  In addition, there is evidence that 
firms that repatriated under the Act increased share repurchases in 2005, suggesting that firms 
used repatriated funds to increase shareholder payouts rather than to increase investment in 
domestic operations (Blouin and Krull, 2009; Graham et al. 2010; Dharmapala et al., 2011).
12
 
  
                                                     
12
These results do not imply that firms violated the terms of the Act.  They simply reflect the fungibility of cash and 
the fact that the Act did not provide for any direct tracing of repatriated funds.  Firms could have used repatriated 
cash to fund existing levels of R&D, employment, and investment, while shifting existing domestic cash to 
shareholder payouts.   
 
 
10 
 
 
 
SECTION 3: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Hartman (1985) first modeled repatriation decisions under the U.S. tax system.  His 
results show that the repatriation tax does not distort decisions on foreign investment versus 
repatriation since, in his model, all foreign earnings are eventually subject to the same 
repatriation tax.  Subsequent research deviates from this assumption.  DeWaegenaere and 
Sansing (2008) include in their model “the occurrence of future tax holidays, implying that it 
may be optimal to temporarily invest earnings on operating assets in financial assets and 
repatriate these financial assets at a tax holiday.”  If firms anticipate another tax holiday similar 
to the AJCA this could incentivize them to accumulate PRE, similar to the tax holiday 
repatriating firms in the DeWaegenaere and Sansing model.  In their model, a firm’s choice 
between investing operating earnings in financial assets and never repatriating those financial 
assets or immediately repatriating operating earnings and never investing in foreign financial 
assets is based on the comparison between the foreign corporate tax rate and the shareholder tax 
rate.  If the shareholder tax rate exceeds the foreign corporate tax rate the firm will choose the 
former; if the foreign corporate tax rate exceeds the shareholder tax rate then it will choose the 
latter.  Adding a future tax holiday into the model can affect both groups.  Firms in the former 
group now have the option to repatriate foreign financial assets during the tax holiday.  Some 
firms in the latter group will now choose to invest in financial assets instead of repatriating all 
operating earnings.          
The limit for qualified dividends under the Act was based in part on previously reported 
PRE.  Therefore, firms that had not previously reported PRE or a tax liability related to PRE 
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were limited to $500 million of qualified dividends under the Act.  Some firms had qualified 
dividends in the tens of billions of dollars, indicating that the $500 million limitation would have 
been binding for some firms if they had not previously reported PRE (Mock and Simon, 2008).   
Although the media has reported significant increases in firms’ PRE in recent years – 
often suggesting those firms are “hoarding” or “stashing” cash and earnings abroad - it is 
possible that those increases are related to expanding investment abroad.
13
  Firms often justify 
their PRE balances as an operational requirement for expanding business in foreign markets.  For 
example, in a recent response letter to the SEC Google maintained that when making decisions 
regarding its amount of permanently reinvested earnings “[t]he main factors considered are the 
funding requirements outside the U.S. for market growth and expansion, and financial 
requirements of our U.S. companies and operations.”   They further explained: 
With respect to the funding requirements for market growth and expansion 
outside the U.S., we expect a significant portion of our future expansion will 
continue to be driven by foreign operations outside the U.S. In fiscal year 2012, 
approximately 50% of our revenues were generated in non-U.S. markets. 
Accordingly, we have significant financial needs outside the U.S. to fund our 
continued market growth and expansion through mergers and acquisitions, on-
going research and development, and investments in datacenter and other 
infrastructure and real property.   
 
Apple similarly defended its decisions regarding PRE, noting: 
The Company’s international markets have grown dramatically in recent years. In 
2012, 61% of the Company’s net sales were outside the U.S.  In recent years, the 
Company has invested significant amounts of cash outside the U.S. on product 
tooling and manufacturing process equipment, long-term supply agreements, the 
Company’s own retail stores and corporate facilities, acquisitions and strategic 
investments, and overall geographic expansion. 
 
As these firms attest, there are plenty of business reasons, unrelated to tax holidays, for a firm to 
continue to increase its PRE.  The results in Blouin et al. (2014) provide some support for these 
                                                     
13See Fontevecchia (2013) and O’Brien (2014) for examples of articles that suggest recent increases in PRE are not 
related solely to investment opportunities.   
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claims, suggesting that a significant portion of PRE is driven by growth incentives and/or 
invested in non-financial assets, contrary to the idea that most firms are simply amassing 
suboptimal amounts of cash abroad.  Therefore, it is not clear whether the recent increases in 
PRE are related to the Act or are simply the consequences of doing business as firms expand 
their international operations.  However, the overwhelming assumption from legislators and the 
media seems to be that firms are stockpiling PRE (beyond amounts related to investment and 
other tax incentives) in anticipation of another repatriation tax holiday.  This leads me to my first 
hypothesis: 
H1: Changes in reported PRE, controlling for other tax and investment incentives, have 
increased in the post-Act period.   
 In addition to confirming whether changes in reported PRE increased in the post-Act 
period, I also investigate which firms drove that change.  Although the tax incentives of the 
repatriation were open to all firms that met the requirements of the Act, not all firms chose to 
repatriate.  For example, Alcoa Inc., which had over $5 billion of PRE according to its 10-K filed 
in early 2003 (which would have established Alcoa’s repatriation limit under the Act), stated in 
its 2005 10-K, “Alcoa did not utilize the AJCA provision that allows companies to repatriate 
earnings from foreign subsidiaries at a reduced U.S. tax rate.”  Oler et al. (2007) discuss the 
decision to repatriate or reinvest foreign earnings and note that, even with the extremely low 
repatriation tax rate under the Act, firms with significantly high-return foreign investment 
opportunities would still forgo repatriation.  However, some firms were extremely interested in 
another tax holiday with some even participating in the Win America campaign, a lobbying 
effort to secure another repatriation tax holiday similar to the Act.
14
  Win America included 
companies such as Pfizer, Cisco Systems, Microsoft, and Apple, which repatriated $37 billion, 
                                                     
14
Kocieniewski (2011) and Rubin and Drucker (2011).   
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$1.2 billion, $780 million, and $755 million, respectively, under the favorable provisions of the 
Act.
15
  This indicates, perhaps unsurprisingly, that firms with some of the largest repatriations 
under the Act were also some of the firms most interested in the enactment of another tax 
holiday.  Therefore, it is possible that the increases in reported PRE were concentrated in firms 
that actually took advantage of the repatriation provisions of the Act and were hoping to take 
advantage of a similar future tax holiday, which leads to hypothesis 1A: 
H1A: Increased changes in reported PRE in the post-Act period are concentrated in firms 
that repatriated funds under the Act.   
 As stated earlier, if a firm decided to repatriate under the Act there were limitations on 
the amount of dividends eligible for the reduced rate.  In general they were limited to the greater 
of $500 million or the amount of reported PRE on the financial statements filed on or before 
June 30, 2003.  Many firms (including Pfizer, Cisco, Microsoft, and Apple) repatriated the 
maximum amount allowed.  These firms in particular could have benefited even more under the 
Act if they had previously reported higher amounts of PRE on their financial statements, 
incentivizing them to report increased amounts of PRE on post-Act financial statements in 
anticipation of another tax holiday, leading to hypothesis 1B: 
H1B: Increased changes in reported PRE in the post-Act period are concentrated in firms 
that repatriated the maximum amount eligible under the Act.   
Clausing (2005) describes how the Act should affect expectations related to future 
repatriations:  
By granting a temporary tax break for firms with large accumulations of untaxed 
profits in low-tax countries, this provision sends the signal that the U.S. 
government may grant such holidays in the future, or perhaps even move toward 
exempting foreign dividends from taxation…firms will have an incentive to 
                                                     
15
I accessed a list of members of the Win America campaign through a copy of 
www.winamericacampaign/supporters archived as of April 2, 2012.   
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repatriate profits during the holiday but will likely face a reduced incentive to 
repatriate in subsequent years, as the prospects have improved for a future “one-
time” holiday, an extension, or even a permanent change.   
While there is language in the legislation that refers to this holiday as a temporary 
stimulus measure, it should nonetheless lead to permanent changes in 
expectations regarding the U.S. tax system. (339) 
 
Oler et al. (2007) show that investors’ valuation of the tax liability related to PRE became less 
negative in 2003 and 2004 as investors anticipated firms’ repatriations at a reduced tax rate under 
the Act.  As Clausing (2005) says the Act “should nonetheless lead to permanent changes in 
expectations regarding the U.S. tax system.”  If the Act did in fact permanently change investors’ 
expectations regarding the U.S. tax system, I expect that the less negative tax expense valuation 
for the AJCA period found in Oler et al. (2007) persists into the post-Act period.
16
  Therefore I 
hypothesize: 
H2:  The investor valuation of repatriation tax liabilities is less negative in the post-Act 
period.  
  
                                                     
16
Oler et al. (2007) also test the market’s valuation of the tax liability related to PRE in 2005 and find that it is 
unchanged from the pre-Act period, indicating that the market believed that future repatriations would not be subject 
to a reduced tax rate.  However, their sample period ended in 2005, at the same time the opportunity to repatriate 
under the Act ended for most firms and before lobbying and proposed legislation for another tax holiday began.   
 
 
15 
 
 
 
SECTION 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE 
 
I begin my analysis with the following model: 
 
ΔPREi,t = α0 + α1ROAdiffi,t-1 + α2FTRi,t  + α3ΔFassetsi,t + α4FCFi,t + α5DivYieldi,t 
+ α6Levi,t  + α7GDPgrowthi,t + α8Lossi,t +α9-15FYi,t + εi,t   (1) 
 
The variables are based on the prior literature, including Krull (2004) and Blouin and Krull 
(2009).  ΔPRE is the current year PRE balance minus the previous year PRE balance, scaled by 
total firm assets.  ROAdiff controls for the difference in expected foreign and domestic return on 
assets, measured at year t-1.  FTR is the firm’s foreign tax rate.  ΔFassets is the annual change in 
foreign assets.  FCF equals annual operating cash flows scaled by total firm assets.  DivYield is 
the ratio of dividends paid to the market value of equity.  Lev controls for the firm’s method of 
financing.  GDPgrowth is equal to U.S. GDP in year t minus U.S. GDP in year t-1, scaled by 
U.S. GDP in year t-1, to control for general macroeconomic effects.  To maximize my sample 
size I also include firms with a domestic loss.  Therefore I include the indicator variable Loss, 
which equals one for observations where the firm has a domestic loss in that year.  FY represents 
indicator variables for each of the seven years (2004 through 2010) after the enactment of the 
AJCA.  (See Appendix A for variable definitions.)  Based on H1 I expect α9 through α15 to be 
positive, indicating that in each post-Act year firms made larger increases to PRE when 
compared to the period before the Act.  In order to test H1A I divide my sample into samples of 
firms that did and did not repatriate under the Act.  To test H1B I divide the sample of 
 
 
16 
 
repatriating firms into firms that did and did not repatriate the maximum eligible amount under 
the Act.
17
 
I expand on the model from Oler et al. (2007) to examine whether investors’ valuation of 
the deferred repatriation tax liability has changed in the post-Act period:  
 
MVEi,t = β0 + β1DNIi,t + β2FNIi,t + β3CSi,t+ β4REi,t + β5PREi,t + β6Taxi,t   
+ β7Posti,t +β8Tax*Posti,t + εi,t      (2) 
 
See Appendix A for variable definitions.
18
  Based on the results in Oler et al. (2007) I expect β6 
to be negative.  As formally stated in H2 I expect β8 to be positive, indicating that in the post-Act 
period investors expect foreign earnings to eventually be repatriated at a lower rate, similar to 
that of the Act.    
I hand collect data on PRE, the related tax liability, and repatriations under the Act from 
firm 10-K filings.  I focus on S&P 500 firms from 1999 through 2010.  I obtain foreign asset data 
from Datastream, share price data from CRSP, and all other data from Compustat.  For my tests I 
focus on firms that already made the decision to report PRE without the additional incentive 
under the Act.  Therefore, for both my firm and market tests I restrict the sample to firms that 
appear in at least seven of the 12 years in my sample period to ensure that I have observations for 
each firm both before and after the Act.
 19
  In addition, for my firm tests, I focus on changes in 
                                                     
17
Since firms do not necessarily disclose past repatriations I can only take into account restrictions based on reported 
PRE, not restrictions based on average past repatriation.  However, the absence of this additional restriction biases 
against finding results since it results in my conservatively coding possible restricted firms as unrestricted.   
 
18
I use the three-year foreign effective tax rate, rather than the five-year rate Oler et al. (2007) use, to calculate TAX 
in order to increase my sample size.  Results (untabulated) are similar if I use the five-year rate.    
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Focusing on S&P 500 firms that appear at least seven years in my sample means that my sample is comprised of 
some of the largest firms in the economy.  For example, mean total assets in my sample is approximately $24.5 
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PRE unrelated to the tax incentives of the Act so I eliminate observations for years when firms 
chose to repatriate under the Act.  Following the prior literature, I winsorize continuous variables 
at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile.   
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample, as well as for repatriating, non-
repatriating, restricted, and unrestricted samples.  Repatriating firms are those firms that reported 
making an eligible repatriation under the Act.  Non-repatriating firms are those firms that 
reported PRE in their 10Ks, but chose not to repatriate under the Act.  Within the sample of 
repatriating firms restricted (unrestricted) firms are those firms that repatriated 95 percent or 
more (less than 95 percent) of the eligible amount.
20,21
   Table 1 Panel B shows that repatriating 
firms on average report significantly higher annual changes in PRE despite having significantly 
lower total and foreign assets compared to non-repatriating firms.  Panel C provides a similar 
view of restricted firms compared to unrestricted firms, although the average total assets of both 
groups are not significantly different.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                           
billion while mean total assets for all Compustat firms for the same period is only $7.4 billion.  I focus on this 
subsample of relatively large firms because these are the firms with the potential to accumulate the most 
PRE/repatriate the most earnings under a future tax holiday. 
 
20
I define eligible amount as the amount designated as PRE on the most recent audited financial statements filed on 
or before June 30, 2003. 
 
21
I use 95 percent rather than 100 percent since firms sometimes use approximations in their disclosures.  For 
example, in its 2002 10-K Intel disclosed that it has “approximately $6.3 billion” of PRE.  Its 2005 10-K noted 
repatriation of $6.2billion under the Act.  Inferences are unchanged if I use 100 percent instead of 95 percent. 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 5: RESULTS 
SECTION 5.1: POST-ACT CHANGES IN PRE  
 
 Before running any regressions I begin by examining the annual changes to PRE in the 
pre- vs. post-Act period.  It seems possible that media and legislators focusing on growing 
annual changes to PRE in the post-Act period are failing to take into account that the firms 
themselves generally continue to grow larger over time.  That is – these larger changes to PRE 
could be driven in part simply by the fact that these are now larger firms.  Therefore, I use the 
ΔPRE variable, which scales the annual change in PRE by total firm assets in order to control for 
effects of the changing size of the firm.  Table 2 Panel A shows that the mean value of ΔPRE in 
the years before the Act (1999-2003) is 0.030 while the mean value in the years after the Act 
(2004-2010) is 0.038, even after scaling for firm size.  In addition the different between these 
numbers is significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that firms have in fact been relatively 
increasing their changes to PRE since the Act.          
To examine each post-Act year and each subsample group separately Table 2 Panel B 
shows the results of regressing ΔPRE on only the year indicator variables (no other control 
variables) for the various sample groups.  Several of the coefficients are positive and significant, 
particularly for FY06 and FY07.  However, many of the coefficients are insignificant, which does 
not support the general conjecture that there has been an ongoing trend of increasing changes to 
PRE since the Act.  Rather, it seems that any widespread increase took place in 2006 and 2007.  
In addition, these results do not account for any of the other variables that are related to changes 
in PRE.     
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Table 2 Panel C shows the results of my main regression.  Column 1 displays the results 
of equation (1) for the entire sample.  If H1 were correct we would see significant positive 
coefficients for each of the year indicator variables, suggesting an ongoing trend of firms 
increasing their annual changes to PRE in all, or at least multiple, years after the Act.  However, 
only one year coefficient, FY06, is significant.  This indicates that while firms may have 
increased their annual changes to PRE in response to the Act, that response was limited to 
immediately after the Act and was not a continuing trend.   
I next investigate whether repatriating firms in particular increased their PRE in the post-
Act period.  Columns 2 and 3 have the results of equation (1) for the samples of repatriating 
(column 2) and non-repatriating firms (column 3).  Under H1A the coefficients for the year 
indicator variables would be larger and/or more significant for the repatriating group sample.  
Like the overall sample the only positive and significant year indicator coefficient for both 
subsamples is FY06.  In addition, that coefficient is larger and more significant for the non-
repatriating sample.  However, a chi-squared test, as shown in column 4 of Table 2 Panel C, fails 
to reject that the year indicator variable coefficients for the two samples are equal.  This result 
suggests, contrary to H1A, that there was no difference in how the two groups altered their 
annual changes to PRE after the Act.          
Table 2 Panel D displays the results for equation (1) for restricted firms (column 1) and 
unrestricted firms (column 2).  The coefficient on FY06 is only significant for the unrestricted 
firm group.  In addition, the FY09 coefficient for the restricted firm group is negative and 
significant.  A chi-squared test, as shown in column 3, suggests that the FY06 coefficients are not 
significantly different from each other.  However, the results suggest that the FY08 and FY09 
coefficients are significantly different between these two groups.  This indicates that restricted 
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firms actually declared relatively lower changes to PRE in 2008 and 2009.  Overall, the results in 
Table 2 Panels C and D indicate that firms increased their annual change to PRE only in 2006, 
rather than as part of an ongoing trend in the years after the Act.  In addition, it seems that this 
change was not concentrated in any one group, but occurred across all firms in the sample.  
Finally, the results also suggest that firms that repatriated the maximum amount under the Act 
actually reported relatively smaller annual changes to PRE during the recent financial crisis.     
To determine whether industry effects are influencing my results I examine the industry 
composition of my sample.  Table 3 Panel A provides the number of firms in each 2-digit SIC 
code for the repatriating, non-repatriating, restricted, and unrestricted samples.  Industries 28 
(Chemicals and Allied Products), 35 (Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer 
Equipment), and 36 (Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and Components, Except 
Computer Equipment) each account for more than 10 percent of the sample.  To confirm that 
none of these industries are driving the results in Table 2 I rerun the regression for the 
subsamples after excluding each industry.  Table 3 Panel B shows the results of the regressions 
and related chi-squared tests for the repatriating and non-repatriating firms, while Table 3 Panel 
C shows the results for the restricted and unrestricted firms.  For brevity I only include the 
statistically significant year indicator variables.  The results of the chi-squared tests remain 
consistent with the results in Table 2.  The only significant year indicator variable for the 
repatriating and non-repatriating samples is FY06 and the coefficients are not significantly 
different between the two groups.  Within the repatriating group sample FY06 continues to only 
be significant for the unrestricted firm group, but, as in Table 2, the chi-squared tests cannot 
reject that the coefficients of the two groups are the same.  Chi-squared tests indicate that the 
 
 
21 
 
FY09 coefficient is significantly lower for the restricted firm group, suggesting that restricted 
firms made relatively smaller changes to PRE in 2009.   
It is worth noting that the industry 28 group contains six of the top 15 repatriations 
identified in the Majority Staff report (Bristol-Myers Squibb, DuPont, Eli Lilly, Johnson & 
Johnson, Pfizer, and Procter & Gamble).
22
  Therefore, I continue my analysis by examining the 
top repatriating firms.   
 In addition to the six chemicals firms mentioned earlier, the other top 15 repatriating 
firms in the sample are Hewlett-Packard, IBM, PepsiCo, Intel, Coca Cola, and Altria.  The top 15 
firms accounted for over half of the total amount repatriated under the Act, so to ensure my 
results are not driven by solely by these large firms I eliminate them from my sample and rerun 
my tests.  The results in Table 4 Panel A columns 2 and 3 show that the FY06 coefficients for 
both the repatriating and non-repatriating firms are significantly positive.  Interestingly, the 
repatriating firm group now also has significant coefficients for FY04 and FY05 (and the non-
repatriating firm sample’s coefficients remain insignificant).  Therefore, I test for differences in 
the coefficients for all the year indicator variables.  However, for all years the chi-squared test 
(results untabulated) fails to reject that the coefficients for the two groups are the same.  Results 
for the restricted and unrestricted samples in Table 4 Panel B are similar to the results in earlier 
tables with unrestricted firms making significantly larger changes to PRE than unrestricted firms 
during the recent financial crisis.     
Next I separate my sample into observations from top 15 and all other firms.
23
 As seen in 
Table 4 Panel C, the FY04 and FY06 coefficients are only positive and significant for non-top 15 
                                                     
22
Only 12 of the top 15 firms appear in my sample.  I cannot include the remaining three top 15 firms, Schering 
Plough, Oracle, and Merck, in my sample because of lack of necessary data.   
23
In this analysis I must omit the FY05 coefficient because most top firms repatriated in 2005 and therefore do not 
have a 2005 observation.   
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firms (and are actually negative for the top 15 firm group).  The chi-squared test indicates that 
the coefficients are statistically significantly different from each other for both years.  These 
results indicate that the significant increase in FY06 seen in the earlier tables was not driven by 
the firms with the largest repatriations under the Act.  In addition, it seems that firms also 
increased their changes to PRE in FY04.  However, given the very small sample for the top 15 
firm group it is possible that low power is driving this result.      
Although my results suggest an increase in changes in PRE specifically in 2004 and 
2006, it is possible that this increase is simply part of a continuing time trend.  To determine 
whether that is the case I examine 1999 through 2003 separately and look for an upward trend 
occurring even before the Act.  I create indicator variables for 2002 and 2003, which serve as my 
pseudo-post period here.   
Column 1 of Table 5 Panel A shows the regression results for the whole sample.  The 
coefficient on FY02 is insignificant, but the coefficient on FY03 is significant, indicating that 
firms began increasing their changes to PRE as legislation for the Act was first introduced.  
Columns 2 and 3 show that the FY03 coefficient is only significant for the repatriating firm 
group.  A chi-squared test confirms that the coefficients are significantly different from each 
other, indicating that repatriating firms significantly increased their annual changes to PRE in 
2003, as legislation related to the Act was introduced, but before the Act was passed.  Columns 4 
and 5 show that only the unrestricted firm group has a significant FY03 coefficient, but the chi-
squared test fails to reject that the coefficients of both groups are the same.     
The results of my tests regarding post-Act changes in PRE indicate that firms generally 
experienced a significant increase in changes to PRE during the time around the Act itself, but 
that the Act did not lead to an ongoing trend of increased changes to PRE throughout recent 
 
 
23 
 
years.  These results contrast reports from the media and legislators that the Act led to a 
widespread “hording” of PRE in anticipation of another similar tax holiday.  Rather it seems that 
recent increases to PRE are related to expanding international operations and tax factors that 
were related to PRE even before the Act.   
 
SECTION 5.2: MARKET VALUATION ANALYSIS  
 
Table 6 provides the results of equation (3).
24
  Column 1 provides the results of the model 
without the post-Act variables.  Similar to Oler et al. (2007) the coefficients on DNI, FNI, CS, 
RE, and PRE are all positive and significant.  The coefficient on Tax is negative and significant.  
Columns 2 through 4 contains a Post indicator variable and a Post*Tax interaction term.  Since 
Oler et al. (2007) show a less negative tax valuation beginning in 2003 in column 2 Post equals 
one for all years 2003 through 2010.  With the addition of these variables the coefficient on Tax 
is now positive and insignificant and the coefficient on Tax*Post is negative and significant.  
These puzzling results indicate that the PRE-related tax liability has a more negative valuation in 
the post-Act period.   It seems possible that rather than the Act permanently adjusting investor 
valuation, investors only adjust valuation when a repatriation tax holiday is likely, as investors 
respond in the pre-AJCA period in Oler et al. (2007).  If that is true, the post period in column 2 
may be dominated by years where investors had a “normal” negative valuation of the tax 
liability, not a less negative valuation in anticipation of a tax holiday.  Therefore, in column 3 I 
set Post equal to one only for 2010, as legislation for another tax holiday was introduced.  The 
coefficient on Tax is negative and significant and the coefficient on Tax*Post is positive and 
significant, indicating that although investors negatively value the tax liability related to PRE 
                                                     
24
Following Oler et al. (2007) I scale by total assets.  Results are similar if I scale by total shares outstanding as in 
Collins et al. (2001).   
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that valuation became less negative as repatriation tax holiday legislation was proposed.  In 
column 4, I set Post equal to one for 2003, 2004, and 2010 to additionally capture the pre-AJCA 
period in Oler et al. (2007) as well and the coefficients are similar to column 3.  Overall, these 
results suggest that although investors continue to react in specific time periods as legislative 
actions indicate a possible tax holiday, the Act did not lead to a permanent shift in investor 
valuation.  
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SECTION 6: CONCLUSION 
 
 In this study I investigate whether firms increased their annual additions to PRE in the 
post-Act period.  My results suggest that firms did increase their changes to PRE in the years 
immediately after the Act was passed (and repatriating firms even increased their changes to 
PRE in advance of the Act), but that there has been no ongoing trend of increased changes to 
PRE since the Act.  In fact, some firms have actually reported relatively smaller changes to PRE 
in recent years.  These results stand in contrast to comments from legislators and the media about 
how firms are hoarding offshore funds as a reaction to the Act and in anticipation of another tax 
holiday.  I also investigate whether the Act permanently altered investors’ valuation of taxes 
related to PRE.  My results suggest that there has not been a permanent shift in valuation, 
although investors did alter their valuation as new legislation was proposed for another tax 
holiday.    Overall, my results provide insight into the firm and market effects of repatriation tax 
holidays.  This knowledge may help legislators as they draft legislation for future repatriation tax 
holidays or move forward with amending the U.S. taxation of foreign corporate earnings.     
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FIGURE 1: PRE FOR FIRMS WITH THE 15 HIGHEST REPATRIATIONS UNDER 
THE ACT 
 
 
 
 
 
In millions of U.S. dollars.  Total reported PRE from the firms with the 15 highest repatriations 
under the Act: Pfizer, Merck, Hewlett-Packard, Johnson & Johnson, IBM, Schering-Plough, 
DuPont, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly, PepsiCo, Procter & Gamble, Intel, Coca-Cola, Altria, 
and Oracle.  Note that PepsiCo began reporting PRE in 2002 and Altria stopped reporting PRE in 
2007.   
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FIGURE 2: U.S. CORPORATE TAX RATE COMPARED TO OECD AVERAGES 
 
 
 
Based on data from Tax Foundation 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
Panel A – Full Sample (N =890) 
 
 
 
 Mean Median 
 
Cumulative PRE  
 
4,228 
 
1,513 
 
Change in PRE 
 
710 
 
236 
 
Foreign Assets 
 
5,816 
 
1,236 
 
Total Assets 
 
24,563 
 
12,631 
 
FTR 
 
0.26 
 
0.24 
 
 
 
Panel B – Repatriating and Non-Repatriating Samples 
 
 
  
Repatriating Sample 
 
Non-Repatriating Sample 
  
N = 648 
 
N = 242 
  
Mean   Median 
 
Mean   Median 
Cumulative 
PRE 
 
         
4,231  
 
1,600 
 
4,220 
 
1,240 
Change in PRE 
 
             
774  
 
254 *** 539 
 
              
182  
Foreign Assets 
 
         
3,515  
 
1,082 *** 11,976 
 
          
1,468 
Total Assets 
 
       
19,656  
 
10,900 *** 37,702 
 
        
17,339 
FTR 
 
            
0.23 
 
         
0.22  ***           0.31  
 
            
0.29  
 
 
The Repatriating Sample includes those firms from the Full Sample in Panel A that elected to 
repatriate earnings from foreign subsidiaries under the Act.  The Non-Repatriating Sample 
includes those firms from the Full Sample in Panel A that elected not to repatriate earnings from 
foreign subsidiaries under the Act.  *, **, and *** indicate a significant difference between the 
mean of these two samples at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.      
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Panel C – Restricted and Unrestricted Samples 
 
 
  
Restricted Sample 
 
Unrestricted Sample 
  
N = 350 
 
N = 298 
  
Mean   Median 
 
Mean   Median 
Cumulative 
PRE 
 
         
4,435  
 
1,897 
 
3,990 
 
1,326 
Change in PRE 
 
             
939  
 
361 *** 581 
 
              
172  
Foreign Assets 
 
         
2,392  
 
931 *** 4,835 
 
          
2,211  
Total Assets 
 
       
18,534  
 
12,274 
 
20,973 
 
        
10,000   
FTR 
 
            
0.20  
 
         
0.18  *** 
          
0.28  
 
            
0.26  
 
 
Descriptive Statistics for the sample used for the regressions in Table 2.  PRE, ΔPRE, Foreign 
Assets, and Total Assets are in millions.  The Restricted Sample includes those firms from the 
Repatriating Sample in Panel B that elected to repatriate at least 95 percent of eligible foreign 
earnings under the Act.  The Unrestricted Sample includes those firms from the Repatriating 
Sample in Panel B that repatriated less than 95 percent of eligible foreign earnings under the Act.  
*, **, and *** indicate a significant difference between the mean of these two samples at the 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.     
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TABLE 2: CHANGES IN FIRM PRE 
 
 
 
Panel A – Pre- vs. Post-Act Comparison 
 
 1999-2003 
(Pre-Act) 
2004-2010 
(Post-Act) 
 
Mean ΔPRE 
 
0.030 0.038 
 
T-test 
 
Mean ΔPRE Post-Act > 
Mean ΔPRE Pre-Act: 
p-value 0.003 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
1
 
Panel B – Regression with Only Post-Act Indicator Variables 
 
 
 (1) 
Full Sample 
(2) 
Repatriating Firms 
(3) 
Non-Repatriating 
Firms 
(4) 
Restricted Firms 
(5) 
Unrestricted 
Firms 
FY04 0.007  0.008  0.008  0.002  0.015  
 (1.34)  (1.29)  (1.43)  (0.24)  (1.61)  
FY05 0.000  0.013  0.008  0.017  0.005  
 (0.06)  (1.51)  (1.56)  (1.36)  (0.54)  
FY06 0.010 *** 0.012 ** 0.013 *** 0.010  0.013 ** 
 (2.81)  (2.55)  (3.42)  (1.38)  (2.50)  
FY07 0.013 *** 0.016 *** 0.010 ** 0.025 *** 0.004  
 (3.21)  (3.05)  (2.58)  (4.43)  (0.40)  
FY08 0.006  0.005  0.011  0.000  0.010  
 (1.22)  (0.91)  (1.52)  (0.01)  (1.14)  
FY09 0.008 * 0.014 *** -0.004  0.011  0.012  
 (1.76)  (2.75)  (-0.44)  (1.56)  (1.55)  
FY10 0.005  0.008  0.000  0.006  0.009  
 (1.01)  (1.29)  (0.01)  (0.58)  (1.32)  
N 890  648  242  350  298  
 
Regressing ΔPRE on only indicator variables for all post-Act years (2004 through 2010).  Firm-clustered standard errors.  Intercept 
omitted for brevity.  t -statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.     
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Panel C - Regression Analysis with Control Variables: Full, Repatriating, and Non-
Repatriating Firm Samples 
 
  
Predicted 
Sign 
(1) 
Full Sample 
(2) 
Repatriating 
Firms 
(3) 
Non-
Repatriating 
Firms  
(4) 
Chi-
Squared 
Test:  
(3) > (2) 
FY04 + 0.007  0.008  0.003  0.714  
  (1.46)  (1.37)  (0.51)    
FY05 + 0.002  0.013  0.004  0.838  
  (0.47)  (1.64)  (0.65)    
FY06 + 0.007 ** 0.008 * 0.010 ** 0.361  
  (2.04)  (1.67)  (2.33)    
FY07 + 0.006  0.007  0.006  0.577  
  (1.38)  (1.24)  (1.16)    
FY08 + -0.001  -0.002  0.008  0.227  
  (-0.20)  (-0.18)  (0.79)    
FY09 + -0.009  -0.006  -0.007  0.515  
  (-1.12)  (-0.67)  (-0.46)    
FY10 + 0.003  0.005  -0.001  0.755  
  (0.68)  (0.87)  (-0.12)    
ROAdiff + 0.003 ** 0.004 ** -0.002    
   (2.15)  (2.16)  (-1.30)    
FTR - -0.047 *** -0.044 *** -0.023 *   
   (-4.31)  (-3.35)  (-1.75)    
ΔFassets + 0.061 ** 0.095 *** 0.050    
   (2.02)  (2.71)  (1.06)    
FCF  + 0.206 *** 0.190 *** 0.144 *   
   (5.12)  (3.83)  (1.91)    
DivYield - -0.179  -0.139  -0.452 *   
   (-1.15)  (-0.72)  (-1.99)    
Lev - -0.008  -0.017 * -0.012    
   (-1.38)  (-1.97)  (1.32)    
GDP- 
growth 
 -0.231 
(-1.69) 
* -0.237 
(-1.53) 
 -0.047 
(-0.20) 
   
Loss  0.012 ** 0.007 * -0.002    
  (2.02)  (1.69)  (-0.36)    
N  890  648  242    
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Panel D – Regression Analysis with Control Variables: Restricted and Unrestricted Firm 
Samples 
 
  
Predicted 
Sign 
(1) 
Restricted  
Firms 
(2) 
Unrestricted  
Firms 
(3) 
Chi-Squared Test: 
(2) > (1) 
FY04 + 0.004  0.011  0.270  
  (0.51)  (1.32)    
FY05 + 0.014  0.006  0.725  
  (1.10)  (0.82)    
FY06 + 0.001  0.012 ** 0.111  
  (0.12)  (2.50)    
FY07 + 0.007  0.002  0.678  
  (1.07)  (0.17)    
FY08 + -0.021  0.016  0.010 *** 
  (-1.68)  (1.52)    
FY09 + -0.032 ** 0.013  0.008 *** 
  (-2.19)  (1.03)    
FY10 + 0.004  0.008  0.353  
  (0.46)  (1.06)    
ROAdiff + 0.003 * -0.004    
   (1.82)  (-0.38)    
FTR - -0.041 * -0.038 **   
   (-1.74)  (-2.27)    
ΔFassets + 0.145 ** 0.078 **   
   (2.51)  (2.15)    
FCF  + 0.200 ** 0.112 **   
   (2.43)  (2.38)    
DivYield - 0.149  -0.329    
   (0.52)  (-1.21)    
Lev - -0.060 ** -0.010 *   
   (-2.45)  (-1.90)    
GDPgrowth  -0.664 ** 0.049    
   (-2.65)  (0.34)    
Loss  0.008  0.010    
  (0.95)  (0.99)    
N  350  298    
 
All variables in Panels C and D are calculated as described in Appendix A.  Intercept and other 
year indicator variables omitted for brevity.  Firm-clustered standard errors.  t-statistics in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 3: INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 
 
Panel A – Industry Concentration 
 
2-Digit 
SIC 
Code 
(1) 
Full Sample 
(2) 
Repatriating 
Firms 
(3) 
Non-
Repatriating 
Firms 
(4) 
Restricted  
Firms 
(5) 
Unrestricted 
Firms 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
13 33 4% 10 2% 23 10% 0 0% 10 3% 
20 73 8% 50 8% 23 10% 29 8% 21 7% 
21 8 1% 8 1% 0 0% 0 0% 8 3% 
23 8 1% 8 1% 0 0% 0 0% 8 3% 
25 10 1% 10 1% 0 0% 10 3% 0 0% 
26 39 4% 39 6% 0 0% 0 0% 39 13% 
28 157 18% 143 22% 14 6% 74 22% 69 23% 
29 29 3% 0 0% 29 12% 0 0% 0 0% 
30 18 2% 18 3% 0 0% 7 2% 11 4% 
33 7 1% 0 0% 7 3% 0 0% 0 0% 
34 8 1% 0 0% 8 3% 0 0% 0 0% 
35 105 12% 88 14% 17 7% 51 15% 37 12% 
36 98 11% 80 12% 18 7% 68 19% 12 4% 
37 32 4% 26 4% 6 2% 18 5% 8 3% 
38 81 9% 63 10% 18 7% 47 13% 16 5% 
39 27 3% 18 3% 9 4% 18 5% 0 0% 
48 8 1% 0 0% 8 3% 0 0% 0 0% 
49 9 1% 9 1% 0 0% 9 3% 0 0% 
50 6 1% 6 1% 0 0% 0 0% 6 2% 
51 17 2% 9 1% 8 3% 9 3% 0 0% 
53 13 1% 0 0% 13 5% 0 0% 0 0% 
54 6 1% 6 1% 0 0% 0 0% 6 2% 
56 15 2% 0 0% 15 6% 0 0% 0 0% 
58 11 1% 11 2% 0 0% 0 3% 11 4% 
59 12 1% 6 1% 6 2% 0 0% 6 2% 
62 10 1% 10 2% 0 0% 10 3% 0 0% 
64 7 1% 7 2% 0 0% 0 0% 7 2% 
73 43 5% 23 4% 20 8% 0 0% 23 8% 
Total 890 
 
648 
 
242 
 
350 
 
298 
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Panel B – Regression Analysis - Samples without Major Industries: Repatriating and Non-
Repatriating Firm Samples  
 
Excluding Industry 28 –  
Chemicals and Allied Products 
 Repatriating 
Firms 
  
Non-Repatriating 
Firms 
FY06 0.010 ** 0.008 * 
  (2.24)  (1.78)  
Chi-Squared Test 
Non-Repatriating 
Firms >  
Repatriating Firms 
FY06: 
p-value 0.648 
 
N 505  228  
 
Excluding Industry 35 –  
Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer 
Equipment 
 Repatriating 
Firms 
  
Non-Repatriating 
Firms 
FY06 0.008  0.010 ** 
  (1.59)  (2.26)  
Chi-Squared Test 
Non-Repatriating 
Firms >  
Repatriating Firms 
FY06: 
p-value 0.358 
 
N 560  225  
 
Excluding Industry 36 –  
Electronic, Except Computer Equipment 
 Repatriating 
Firms 
  
Non-Repatriating 
Firms 
FY06 0.011 ** 0.009 * 
  (2.29)  (2.02)  
Chi-Squared Test 
Non-Repatriating 
Firms >  
Repatriating Firms 
FY06: 
p-value 0.625 
 
N 568  224  
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Panel C – Regression Analysis - Samples without Major Industries: Restricted and 
Unrestricted Firm Samples  
 
 
 
All variables in Panels B and C are calculated as described in Appendix A.  Intercept, control 
variables, and other year indicator variables omitted for brevity.  Firm-clustered standard errors.  
t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively.       
Excluding Industry 28 –  
Chemicals and Allied Products 
 Restricted Firms 
  
Unrestricted Firms 
FY06 0.006  0.012 ** 
  (0.76)  (2.24)  
FY09 -0.045 ** 0.018  
 (-2.60)  (1.00)  
Chi-Squared Test  
Unrestricted Firms > Restricted Firms 
FY06:  p-value 0.242 
FY09:  p-value 0.004 
N 276  229  
Excluding Industry 35 –  
Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 
 Restricted Firms 
  
Unrestricted Firms 
FY06 0.001  0.012 ** 
  (0.08)  (2.70)  
FY09 -0.023  0.006  
 (-1.64)  (0.59)  
Chi-Squared Test  
Unrestricted Firms > Restricted Firms 
FY06:  p-value 0.110 
FY09:  p-value 0.043 
N 299  261  
Excluding Industry 36 –  
Electronic, Except Computer Equipment 
 Restricted Firms 
  
Unrestricted Firms 
FY06 0.007  0.012 ** 
  (0.80)  (2.52)  
FY09 -0.028 * 0.014  
 (-1.78)  (1.10)  
Chi-Squared Test  
Unrestricted Firms > Restricted Firms 
FY06:  p-value 0.273 
FY09:  p-value 0.016 
N 282  286  
    
 
37 
 
TABLE 4: TOP REPATRIATING FIRMS 
 
Panel A – Regression Analysis - Sample without Top 15 Repatriating Firms – Full, 
Repatriating Firm, and Non-Repatriating Firm Samples 
 
 
  
Predicted 
Sign 
(1) 
Full Sample 
(2) 
Repatriating 
Firms 
(3) 
Non-Repatriating 
Firms  
FY04 + 0.011  0.014 ** 0.003  
  (2.29)  (2.29)  (0.51)  
FY05 + 0.004  0.014 * 0.004  
  (0.73)  (1.68)  (0.65)  
FY06 + 0.009 ** 0.010 ** 0.010 ** 
  (2.38)  (1.96)  (2.33)  
FY07 + 0.006  0.007  0.006  
  (1.17)  (1.01)  (1.16)  
FY08 + -0.001  -0.000  0.008  
  (-0.04)  (-0.04)  (0.79)  
FY09 + -0.013  -0.011  -0.007  
  (-1.37)  (-0.96)  (-0.46)  
FY10 + 0.004  0.007  -0.001  
  (0.77)  (0.94)  (-0.12)  
ROAdiff + 0.004 ** 0.004 ** -0.002  
   (2.29)  (2.19)  (-1.30)  
FTR - -0.040 *** -0.037 *** -0.023 * 
   (-3.84)  (-2.88)  (-1.75)  
ΔFassets + 0.049  0.075  0.050  
   (1.48)  (1.67)  (1.06)  
FCF  + 0.197 *** 0.178 *** 0.144 * 
   (4.89)  (3.58)  (1.91)  
DivYield - -0.343 * -0.320  -0.452 * 
   (-1.93)  (-1.36)  (-1.99)  
Lev - -0.005  -0.014 * -0.012  
   (-0.97)  (-1.80)  (1.32)  
GDPgrowth  -0.297 ** -0.334 * -0.047  
   (-2.04)  (-1.98)  (-0.20)  
Loss  0.012 * 0.011  -0.002  
  (1.87)  (1.53)  (-0.36)  
N  778  536  242  
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Panel B – Regression Analysis - Sample without Top 15 Repatriating Firms – Restricted 
and Unrestricted Firm Samples 
 
 
  
Predicted 
Sign 
(1) 
Restricted  
Firms 
(2) 
Unrestricted  
Firms 
(3) 
Chi-Squared 
Test: 
(2) > (1) 
FY04 + 0.014 ** 0.012  0.579  
  (2.27)  (1.15)    
FY05 + 0.017  0.005  0.780  
  (1.19)  (0.76)    
FY06 + 0.005  0.012 ** 0.256  
  (0.67)  (2.15)    
FY07 + 0.008  0.000  0.708  
  (1.11)  (0.04)    
FY08 + -0.021  0.018  0.017 ** 
  (-1.43)  (1.46)    
FY09 + -0.039 ** 0.014  0.011 ** 
  (-2.29)  (0.82)    
FY10 + 0.008  0.008  0.486  
  (0.75)  (0.83)    
ROAdiff + 0.003 * -0.005    
   (1.90)  (-0.38)    
FTR - -0.035  -0.034 *   
   (-1.50)  (-1.98)    
ΔFassets + 0.099  0.078    
   (1.25)  (1.58)    
FCF  + 0.209 ** 0.098 *   
   (2.49)  (1.91)    
DivYield - -0.041  -0.486    
   (-0.12)  (-1.24)    
Lev - -0.051 * -0.009 *   
   (-1.99)  (-1.72)    
GDPgrowth  -0.835 *** 0.027    
   (-3.10)  (0.14)    
Loss  0.007  0.013    
  (0.71)  (1.04)    
N  289  247    
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Panel C – Regression Analysis - Top 15 Firms vs. Non-Top 15 Firms 
 
 (1) 
Top 15 Firms 
  
(2) 
Non-Top 15 Firms  
FY04 -0.026  0.011 ** 
  (-1.33)  (2.30)  
FY06 -0.011  0.009 ** 
  (-0.98)  (2.36)  
FY07 0.004  0.006  
  (0.31)  (1.17)  
FY08 -0.010  -0.001  
  (-0.81)  (-0.09)  
FY09 0.008  -0.013  
  (0.45)  (-1.41)  
FY10 -0.003  0.004  
  (-0.30)  (0.74)  
Chi-Squared Test 
FY04(Non-Top15 Firms) > 
FY04(Top15 Firms): 
p-value 0.022 
 
FY06(Non-Top15 Firms) > 
FY06(Top15 Firms): 
p-value 0.035 
 
 
N 111  737  
 
All variables in Panels A, B, and C are calculated as described in Appendix A.  Intercept and 
control variables omitted for brevity.  Firm-clustered standard errors.  t-statistics in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.       
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TABLE 5: PRE-ACT PERIOD ANALYSIS 
 
 (1) 
Full Sample 
(2) 
Repatriating  
Firms  
(3) 
Non-Repatriating 
 Firms 
(4) 
Restricted  
Firms 
(5) 
Unrestricted  
Firms 
FY02 0.007  0.007  0.001  0.013  -0.000  
  (1.05)  (0.90)  (0.05)  (0.86)  (-0.05)  
FY03 0.009 ** 0.012 *** -0.002  0.008  0.017 *** 
 (2.13)  (2.63)  (-0.26)  (1.05)  (2.96)  
ROAdiff 0.002  0.005 ** -0.002  0.002  0.018 *** 
  (0.88)  (2.12)  (-1.69)  (0.64)  (2.96)  
FTR -0.025 ** -0.035 ** 0.007  -0.066 * -0.011  
  (-2.17)  (-2.39)  (0.56)  (-1.93)  (-0.79)  
ΔFassets 0.026  0.028  0.033  0.062  0.017  
  (0.83)  (0.49)  (0.87)  (0.65)  (0.34)  
FCF  0.218 *** 0.217 *** 0.147  0.248 ** 0.131 *** 
  (4.84)  (3.83)  (1.68)  (2.34)  (3.30)  
DivYield -0.400 ** -0.278  -0.593 ** 0.105  -0.189  
  (-2.31)  (-1.36)  (-2.22)  (0.19)  (-1.34)  
Lev -0.005  -0.011 * 0.018 *** -0.042  -0.007 ** 
  (-0.75)  (-1.72)  (3.45)  (-1.45)  (-2.39)  
GDPgrowth -0.138  -0.135  0.041  -0.477 * 0.057  
  (-1.07)  (-0.92)  (0.13)  (-1.92)  (0.72)  
Loss -0.002  -0.001  -0.011  -0.000  0.002  
 (-0.35)  (-0.19)  (-1.01)  (-0.03)  (0.18)  
Chi-Squared 
Test 
 
 
FY03(Repatriating Firms) > 
FY03(Non-Repatriating Firms): 
p-value 0.035 
FY03(Unrestricted Firms) > 
FY03(Restricted Firms): 
p-value 0.145 
N 341  267  74  138  129  
All variables are calculated as described in Appendix A.  Intercept omitted for brevity.  Firm-clustered standard errors.  t-statistics in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.      
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TABLE 6: INVESTOR VALUATION 
 
 Predicted 
Sign 
(1) 
Without Post 
(2) 
Post: 2003-2010 
(3) 
Post: 2010 
(4) 
Post: 2003, 
2004, and 2010 
Intercept  0.753 *** 0.763 *** 0.750 *** 0.791 *** 
   (4.11)  (4.34)  (4.10)  (4.30)  
DNI + 4.986 *** 4.188 *** 4.951 *** 4.950 *** 
   (8.26)  (7.21)  (8.21)  (8.21)  
FNI + 7.965 *** 9.122 *** 8.292 *** 8.069 *** 
   (5.41)  (6.37)  (5.59)  (5.47)  
CS + 0.987 ** 0.823 ** 0.983 ** 0.904 ** 
   (2.28)  (1.97)  (2.27)  (2.08)  
RE + 1.245 *** 1.356 *** 1.240 *** 1.216 *** 
   (3.07)  (3.49)  (3.06)  (3.00)  
PRE + 2.794 *** 2.638 *** 2.931 *** 2.717 *** 
   (4.56)  (4.49)  (4.76)  (4.41)  
Tax  - -13.839 *** 4.815  -14.862 *** -15.132 *** 
   (-6.74)  (1.53)  (-6.83)  (-6.97)  
Post ?   -0.150 *** -0.277 ** -0.035  
     (-1.85)  (-2.00)  (-0.45)  
Tax*Post +   -17.921 *** 4.040 * 3.159 * 
     (-6.88)  (1.75)  (1.86)  
 
All variables are calculated as described in Appendix A.  N = 957.  Model includes firm fixed 
effects.  t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively.        
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
ΔPRE The change in permanently reinvested earnings reported in the notes to the 
financial statements from year t-1 to year t.  ΔPRE is scaled by total 
worldwide assets. 
ROAdiff The difference between the foreign and domestic after-tax return on assets 
in year t- 1.  The foreign after-tax return on assets equals foreign pretax 
income less current foreign taxes, divided by identifiable foreign assets. The 
domestic after-tax return on assets equals domestic pretax income less 
current domestic taxes, divided by domestic assets. 
FTR The average foreign tax rate equal to year t foreign taxes divided by year t 
foreign earnings before taxes 
ΔFassets The change in foreign from year t-1 to year t, scaled by year t total 
worldwide assets. 
FCF Operating cash flow, scaled by year t total worldwide assets 
DivYield Year t dividends paid divided by market value of equity at the end of year t. 
Lev Total debt divided by market value of equity (MVE), both measured at the 
end of year t. 
GDPgrowth U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) year t minus U.S. GDP year t-1, scaled 
by U.S. GDP year t-1 
LOSS Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a domestic after-tax loss for the 
year, 0 otherwise. 
POST Indicator variable equal to 1 in the post-Act period (fiscal year ending after 
enactment of the Act), 0 otherwise.  
MVE Market value of common equity three months after fiscal year-end. 
DNI After-tax financial statement domestic income. 
FNI After-tax financial statement foreign income. 
CS Total common equity less total retained earnings at the end of the fiscal 
year. 
RE Total retained earnings less PRE at the end of the fiscal year. 
PRE Permanently reinvested earnings reported in the financial statement 
footnotes. 
FETR The average foreign tax rate (current foreign taxes divided by foreign 
earnings before taxes) from year t-2 to year t. 
TAX The unrecognized deferred tax liability associated with PRE at the end of 
the fiscal year.  TAX is estimated based on the three-year cumulative 
foreign effective tax rate (FETR).  If FETR is greater than the top U.S. 
statutory rate of 35 percent, then the ﬁrm has zero expected tax liability 
upon repatriation, and TAX is set to 0.  If the FETR is less than 35 percent, 
then the ﬁrm has a positive expected tax liability upon repatriation, and 
TAX is computed as [PRE ÷ (1 – FETR)]*(0.35 – FETR). 
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